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ABSTRACT 
This pape! extends Mankiw & Whinston' s (86) characterization of excessive entry to the case 
where finns, in addition to producing, can also make a detenninistic cost reduction 
investment, either before, or at the same time as production. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper extends Mankiw & Whinston's (86) characterization of excessive entry to the case where finns, 
in addition to produdng, can also invest in marginal produmon cost redumonl . The deterministic investment 
can occur before, or at the same time as production. The problem of excessive in the presence of investment arises 
for example in the Research and Development literature. 
Mankiw & Whinston (86) (M-W) showed for the no investment case, tha! in homogeneous product markets 
with fixed cosfS, there is a bias for excessive entry2. They analyzed a two stage game, where fjrst firms decide 
whether io enter the industry, and next play an oligopolistic game, and compared the nl1Il'ib€r entry of firrns 
that enter the market in a free-entry equilibrium, with the second-besfl welfare-maximizing number of finns. 
The appeal of M-W's characterization of excessive entry is that it consisfS of two intuitive and easy to 
check conditions. The first is imperfect competition: the equilibrium price exceeds marginal costo The second is 
the business stealing effect: the equilibrium strategic response of existing finns to new entry, is to lower output. 
With fixed costs, even if there is free entry, an industry wil1 not consisi of a large number of infínitesimal 
firms, but rather of an oligopoly. If a finn4 by entering the market causes other imperfectly competitive finns fo 
reduce their output, and if the other finns have positive profit margins, they lose income. The entrant's 
contribution to social surplus equals his profit, Iess the social value of the output lost due to the output reduction 
he imposes to other firros. Thus, enhy is more valuable to the entrant than to society. The welfare 10ss of free 
entry disappears as the fixed cost approaches zero. 
A1though investment expenditures are choice variables for firms, once made they are fixed costs for 
production. Firms must eam quasi rents in equilibrium fo cover them, leading to an oligopoJistic market. Also, 
since by rising its investment a firm can improve its competitiveness in the product market, imperfectly 
competitive firrns may not minimize total (production plus invesbnent) costs, but rather use investment 
strategically. This strategic effect can generate an additional inefficiency: socialIy excessive investment. 
1 show that M&W's characterization also appUes when finos invest. 1 make three observations. First, 
when investment and production are simuItaneous, imperfect competition and the business stealing effed are 
1 For example: proc:ess Research and Developm"llt, or lnvestment In capital thatrises Ihe marginal productivity oflabor. 
2 With product heterogeneity, the bias can be reversed, sinee entry entails Ihe creation ofmore product diveIsilY, whlch is sociallyvaluable. 
3That is, given !he fums' ollgopolistic behavior. 
4 That 1$ small ¡¡nd thus has no firsl order effects on price, which Is somewhat inconsislenl wilh the exislence of Rxed eosls. 
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still suffident for excessive entry. When total costs are roinimized, the characterization of excessive entry 
reduces to the ro investment case, whether investment oo:urs befare or precedes production. And when oulput 
and investment are simultaneous, firms minimize me cost of producing their chosen output. Second, for a Coumot 
oligopoly, without investment, or with simultaneous ínvestment and production, the busúress stetlling effect 15 
equivalent to strategic substituttlbility5 oí the firros' outputs. TIrird, for a Coumot oligopoly where investment 
precedes production, strategic substituttlbility oí the firms' outputs, in addition to the business stetlling effect 
are suflícient for excessive entry. Por this model the business stetlling effect and stmtegic substitutability are 
not equivalent. 
Previous analysis oí excessíve entry when finns also invest was limited to specific models. Tandon (84) 
showed, for Dasgupta & Stiglitz's (80) mode! oí a Coumot oligopoly with simultaneous investment and 
production, that when demand is linear6, and marginal eosts constant, welfare falls with the number of firms, 
at me free entry leve!. Since a fall in the number of firms from the free entry level rises welfare, exeessive entry 
follows. He questioned if the result depended en the functional fonns used7 • But, since investment and 
production are simultaneous, excessive entry depends only en the business stealit¡g effect. Okllno-Fujiwara & 
Suzumura (93) showed for a Coumot oligopoly where investment precedes production, that when the elastidty 
of the slope of the inverse demand function is oounded below, the firros' oulputs are strategic substitufes, and 
marginal production eosts constant, welfare faHs with the number oí firms at the free entry level. 
In section 2 1 introduce the models. In section 3 1 analyze the case where investment and production occur 
sirnultaneously, and in section 4 the case where investment precedes production. 
2 The Model 
In this section 1 describe two models where firrns decide whether to enter the industry, and ehoose 
investment and produetion levels. In the first, the simultaneous model, investment and produetion are chosen 
siroultaneously. In the second, the sequential model, production is chosen after investment. 
2.1 Common Notation and Assumptions 
In tbis sub-section I introduce notatlon and assumptions eoromon to both roodels. 
5 F1m1S' outputs are 5trategic substit1.lUs, when a rise in a rival's oulput reduces the marginal profilability of a f1rm's oulput (Bulow, 
Geanakoplos & Klemperer (SS)). This OCCUIS, íos: example, in a Cournot oligopoly with downward sloping besl response functions. 
6 Dasgupla &: Stiglilz's (SO) considered an lsoe1asticinversedemand function. 
1 Tandon (84), footnote 14. 
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Consider a market for a homogeneous good that f opens or one periodo 
There is a unit mass DE identi 1 ca consumers. Consumers have an utility fundi n U( -the u t' o q,m) - u(q) + m, where q is 
q an 1ty ronsumed of the good and m is money, of the fonu U( ). 9t+ X 9t+ 9t d'ff . .,.. o o -----7 ; u(.) is twice 
1 erentiable, strictly increasing and concave. The inverse de . mand function, NQ), where Q is the . d 
tp t 
. In ustry's 
ou u,lsoftheformP()'9I:+ 91:+ d' • • -----? , an IS once differentiable and decreasing. 
There is a (countable) infinity of identieal finns Pirro i' d' . s pro uction cost function C(q·e·) where q d 
firm ., od . " " jan eiare 
tS pr uction and invesbnent levels, is of the form C(.,.), + 91:0 x '3tÓ -----? 9tÓ, is onre differentiable and 
increasing in output, twice differentiable, decreasing and convex in investment, and the 
cest is decreasing in investment C > O e < O e > o e o 
marginal production 
9 " 'te , '1"< • 
2.2 The Simultaneous Model 
In this Sllb-section 1 introduce the simultaneous model The sim lt 
. . u aneous rnodel consists of two stages (figure 
1). In stage 1, fmns decide simultaneously whether to enter the industry' if a firm d 'd . 
. ' en es to enter ti must paya 
fixed cost F > O. In stage 2, finns simultaneously determine investment and production levels8. 
[Inserl figure 1 here] 
Stage 2 is sorne oligopolistic game not modeled explidtly. Howev 1 . 
. . er, assume that gtven any number of 
flm1S, It has a unique syrnmetric equilibrium in pure strategies De t fi ' d • no e a rm s stage 2 equilibrium investment 
an output, given that n firms entered the industry by e(n) and q( ) A f ' 
._ p , n . lnn s stage 2 equilibrium ptlyoff is: rnn) 
.- (nq(n»q(n) - C(q(n),e(n» - e(n). Stage 2 equilibrium is (e(n),q(n)]. 
A firm's stage 1 strategy is an in or out decision. A firm's ptlyofffor the whole game is Il(n;F) := mn) - F A 
free entry equilibrium is defined as an asymmetric9 subgam rf .... . 
. .. epe ecteqUlhbnllmm pure strategies of the whoIe 
game, which sabsÍles the free entry condition: 
where nf is the free entry equilibrium number of fi . nns. A free entry equllibrium is (nf,e(n/),q(nf)}. 
Por both the present and the following model I assume that the free entry equilibrium number f f 
exactly satisfies the free entry condition (i el' o ums 
.. , assume away the mteger constraint): 
mnf)=O. (1) 
8 1 say determine rather than choose because fi . 
9 The only symmelric equUibrlum" _.1 rms nught choose prices rather !han quantities. 
15 m rnixo:u stralegies (Dixit &: Shapiro (1986». 
2.3 The Sequential Model 4 
In this sub-section 1 introduce the sequential ruodel. The sequential madel consists of three stages (figure 2). 
In stage 1, firms decide simultaneollsly whether to enter the industry¡ if a firm decides to enter it must pay fixed 
cost F>O. In stage 2, finns simultaneously choose an inveshnent leve!' At the end of this stage the industry 
investrnent profile becomes cornmon knowJerlge. In stage 3, finns simultaneously choose a production level. 
{Insert figure 2 here] 
Stages 2 and 3 are oligopolistic games, which are not modeled explicitIy. However, 1 assume that: given 
any number of firms and investment profile, stage 3 has a unique symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies, and 
given any number of firms, stage 2 has a unique synunetric subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, where 
the relevant game is defined by stages 2 and 3. Denote a firm's stage 3 equilibrium output, given that n firms 
entered the industry and the industry investment profile is e := (ev ... ,e .. ) by q(e,n). A firm's stage 3 payoff is: 
rne,n) := P(nlj(e,n) Hj(e,n) - C(q(e,n) ,e) - e. Denote a firm's stage 2 equilibrium investment level by len) . A 
firm's stage 2 equilibrium payoffis: rnn) := P(nq(e(ntn) )q(e(n),n) - C(ij(i;i(n),n),e(n»)- len) . Stage 2'ssubgame 
perfect equilibrium is {e(n) ,lj(e(n),n) l. 
A firm's stage 1 strategy is an in orout decision. A firm's payofffor the whole game is fl(n;F) := rnn) - F. A 
free entry equilibrium is defined as an asyrnmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies of the whole 
game, which satisfies (1). A free entry equilibrium is {ñf, e(w) ,q(i(ñf),w) l. 
Denote a firm's' equilibrium output in the sequential model by q(n) : =ij(e(n),n). Define iJq liJe := (oC¡ ¡foe;) + 
(n -1)(oq loe¡), then dlj /dn = <aq /an) + (Olj liJe) (dé jdn). Define A:= ¡jn¡oq/lq¡ = P' + q¡P". 
2.4 Additional Assumptions 
In this sub-sectíon 1 recall M-W's conditions for excessive entry and introduce an additíonaI assumption. 
M-Ws conditíons for excessive entry are: 
(A.l) (i) nq(n)'n'q(n'), \In>'" 
(ii) Iim nq(n)<oo: 
"-
(A.2) q(n) < q(ñ), \ln>ñ 
(A.3) P(Q(n)) _ dC(q(~,e(n)) , O, \In 
= 
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The first, guarantees that the free entry equilibrium number of firms is well defined. The second, is the 
business stealing effect. The third, i5 the imperfect competition requirement. 
Next 1 introduce the additional assumption that firrns' outputs are strategic substitutes. 
(A.4) A < O 
3 Analysis of the Simultaneous Model 
In tms section 1 present 2 results: first, for the simuItaneous model strategic substitutability and imperfect 
competition are sufficient for excessive entry, second, for a simultaneous Caumot oligopoly, with or without 
invesbnent, the business stealing effect is equivalent to strategic substitutability of the finns' outputs. 
The socially optimal number of firms, n*, solves: 
max W(n) = 
". 
whose necessary condition is: 
nq(n) 
f pes) ds - nC(q(n),e(n» - ne(n) - nF 
o 
dW(n') (dC)"" (iJC )de ~=mn*)+n* P- a:¡ ~-n'\:~re+l dn =0. 
(2) 
Comparison with the equivalent expression oí the problem without investment, shows that investment 
generates the additional tenn [(iJC/de) + l)(de/dn)n·, whose sign depends on [(dC/de) + lJ, which has to do 
with whether total costs are minimized10, and (de/dn), which has to do with how a finn's equilibrium 
investment varies with the number of íions in the industry. When total costs are minimized, the additional 
tenn disappears, since fJCjiJe + 1 = O. Next 1 argue, that for the simultaneous model total costs are minimized. 
In stage 2 firms either play non-cooperatively, or cooperatively, Le., fonn a cartel. The cartel solves the 
monopoly problem, and then distributes costs and revenues amongits members. And a monopolist minimizes the 
cost oí producing its chosen outputll . Furthermore, the timing of invesbnent is irrelevant. For the non-
cooperative oligopoly, since output and invesbnent are detennined simultaneously, whatever its opponents' 
inveshnent and production strategies may be, a firm best responds by minimizing the cost of producing its chosen 
output. Hence, in every Nash equilibria, costs are minimized, given the productíon IeveL Surnmarizing: 
10 Theneeessary oondition forwstminimization prohlem, mm C(q,c) .¡. e s.t. q = q: ,Js: C4 .¡.1 '" O. 
11 lnvestmomt ls nol used strategically hecause the cattel's ot the monopolist's problem is a declsioll fheordicprohlem. 
Lemma 1: For the simultaneous model, total costs are minimized. 6'11 
When total costs are minimized, an argument identical to M-W's for the ro investment case, shows that 
conditions (Al)-(A3) are suffident for excessive entry12, leading to the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: For the simultaneous model (Al)-(A3) are sufficient for socially excessive entry. '11 
Next 1 present sorne examples that illustrate the previous discussion. 
Example 1: The Bertrand-Edgeworth Model: Absence of Business Stealing. Suppose Iirms have constant 
marginal costs, and face a capacity constraint q;::;; ij '" 1. Assume q is ¡nvariant to investment and P(1) > C,l1,e¡), 
\fe;. In equilibrium: each fino produces at capacity, the industry output equals the number of firms in the 
industry, the price c1ears the market, and firms enter the industry if P(n) - OLe;) - ei ;;; O. Additional entry 
entails no business loss fur the firms in the industry, and invesbnent' s necessary condition is: - C/q¡,e¡) -1 '" 013.']1 
Example 2 : The Cartel. A cartel's problem is: ~al P(Q)Q - C(Q,EJ - E, where E:= ne is the cartel 
invesbnent leve1. Investment's necessary condition is: -C. - 1 ::: O. '11 
Example 3: The Simultaneous Cournot Oligopoly. A Cournot oligopolist's problem is: max P(QJq¡ - C( q¡,e¡) -
•• 
/!j. The necessary condition for investment is: -C. - 1 '" O. '11 
Next 1 argue that for a Coumot oligopoly, with or without investment, the business stealing effect is 
equivalent to strategic substitutability of the firros' outputs. Applying the implidt function theorem to the 
necessary conditions of both mentioned cases gives (see appendix A for details): 
sign{dq(n)/dn} "" sign(A} '" sign{P' + qP"} 
Thus, the business stealing effect 1S present, if the firms' outputs are strategic substitutes, A< O, which occurs if 
demand is not too convex: (-P~/p') < l/q. Summarizing: 
Proposition 2: For a simultaneous Coumot oHgopoly, with or without investment, the business stealing 
effect is equivalent to strategic substitutability oí the firms' outpuls, Le. (A.2) is equivalent to (A.4). 'If 
~~ (A1~-(A3) imply profitis non-rncreasing in 11, and lhal: O", llfrIJ '" dW(n~J!dn s;IJ(n~). Given that profil isnon-increasing in n: n' ~lIf. 
Nolice that fue tlmlng of rnveslment is irrelevanl. 
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Propositions 1 and 2 address Tandon (84)'5 roncero of whether his result depended en the functional fonns 
used. For bis and Dasgupta & Stiglitz's (80) model, excessive entry depends on demand nol being too convexo 
4 Analysis of the Sequential Model 
In this section 1 show that for the sequential Coumot oUgopoly an additional condition is required for 
socially excessive entry: strategic substitutabilify of the firms' outputs. 
The sodally optimal number oí finns, n", solves (2), whose necessary condition is now: 
dW(n") :::Il(n")+n* (p_ dCIaq + aq dé]_n«ac + 1)& :::0 
dn l dq an (ledn (le dn 
Again, when total costs are minimized the tenn associated with investment disappears, and conditions 
(A.l)-(A.3) are sufficient for excessive entry. Although that happens fur a cartel, row it ls not always in the 
firm's interest to minimize the cost of producing its chosen output. In tbe production stage, even iI a firm wanted 
to readjust its investment, given its choice of output and the opponents' strategies, it could ro longer do so, 
because the investment decision has already been made in the previous stage. This commitment effect that 
investment can have in the sequential mode1, creates an incentive fur total costs to deviate &om its minimum, 
towards socially excessive investments, as firms attempt to rise their competitiveness in the production stage 
(Brander & Spencer (83), Bulow, Geanakoplos, & Klemperer, (85». 
When total costs are not minimized, and there is over invesbnent, the welfare impact of entry is 
potentially ambiguous. Entry has a negative impact due to the business stealing effect. But, if the entrant causes 
firms to reduce their investments, entry also has the positive impact of mitigating over investment. In that 
case, entry causes an aggregate invesbnentcontraction of n(de /dn) and a rise in weIfare oI - (C. + 1) n(de /dn). 
Next 1 show that, if in addition to the business stealing etfect one assumes that the firms' outputs are 
strategic substitutes, excessive entry follows again. 1 will proceed in four steps (see appendix B for details). 
First, applying the implicit function theorem to stage 3's necessary condition gives: 
sign{aq (é(n) ,n)/an} "" sign{A}. 
Thus a¡ ¡Un < O, under strategic substitutabilify. 
Second, applying the implicit function theorem to stage 2's necessary condition gives: 
sign{aq ¡(e(n) ,n)/ae¡} = sign{A} 
Thus, aq¡/ae¡ < O, under strategicsubstitutabilify. Also aq/ae:== (aq¡jae¡) +(n -l)(aqj/ae¡) > o. 
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Third, inspection af the stage 2'5 necessary condition shows that if dq j1Je¡ < O, then (C~ + 1) > O. 
Forth, the business sfealing effect, and íJq liJe> 0, imply: de/dn < -(a1¡/ae)j(a1¡/iJe). Replacing on the 
necessary conrlition for welfare maximization it follows that: 
dW(n*) < I1(n"J + n" (oC + l)o&/iJn 
dn Cle iJq/ae (3) 
and that the last terro in (3) is negative. Excessive entry folIows by M-W's argumento Surnmarizing: 
Proposition 3: For a sequential Coumot oligopoly (A.l)-(A.4) are suffident for socially excessive entry. '.II 
Okuoo-Fujiwara & Suzumura (93) a5$llmed a class of inverse demand funclions whose slope has an elasticity 
bounded below. This dass of does not necessarily imply strategic substitutability. However, the authors also 
assumed strategic substitutability. 
Condition (3) was derived for a Cournot olígopoly, but depends only on: the business stealing effect, aq /iJn 2:: 
0, ¡¡q lik > 0, and C. + 1 2:: 0, independently of the stages 2 and 3 oligopolistic games. 
To darify the importance of assuming both the business stealing effect, and that the finns' outputs are 
strategic substitutes, notice that given (see appendix B): 
~r.de) ¡ o<j· o<j' o<j, ~ ",<j. ilq. dQ) 
Sib ,\. dn = sign - Ceq an' + C¡¡P'~+ (o -l)P' On iJe¡ + (n -l)P'qi~+ (n -l)qi~" dn 
and that dq Idn := (iJe¡ liJn ) + (iJq /(Je) (de /dn), it follows that for the Cournot sequential model, strategic 
substitutability, is neither ne<:essary nor sufficient for the business stealing effectH . 
Appendix A 
Consider the necessary condition for the firm's problem without investment: 
Ilq = P{nq) + q P'(nq) - Cq(q,e) "" O 
Applyíng the implicit function theorem: dq(nJj dn "" [-qAj(n + l)P' +nqP" -Cqq ]. Since slÚficiency requires (n 
+ l)P' + nqP" - Cqq < o, it follows that: sign{dq(n)Jdn} = sign{A}. 
Consider the system of the necessary conditions for the firm's problem with investment: 
I:L¡ = P(nq) + q P'(nq) - c,<q,e) = O 
!l.=-c.(q,e)-l=O 
14 As Okuno-Fujiwara & SUlUmura (93) observed, in general, strategic substitutability of the fum's outputs does no! even imply strategic 





n" ][dq/dn] =[- n,o] 
IL.. de/dn - nen 
Applying Cramer's rule: deJdn= IIQI/A = qA/L1, dq/dn= (-Il,p.IIm)j.1 = qACuj.1, where L1 = llqqlle. - (lIq.)2 
IlqqCu. - (Cq.)2 > O. Since Ce. is positive at the optimum15: sign{dq(n)fdn) = sign{de(n)/dn) = sign{A}. 
Appendix B .. 
First, applying the implidt function theorem to stage 3's necessary condttion: 
gives: iJq/iJn = [-qAj(n + l)P'+nqp"-Cqq ]. Sufficiency requires (n + l)P' + ni¡ P" - Cqq < O, thus: sgn{iJq/iJn] 
Second, using the envelop theorem, stage 2's necessary condUion is: 
Differentiating with respect to e¡ and e¡ gives: 
o<j 0-' fi..-.!+ (n-1) nj~ -Cqe=O 
11 e¡ Oe¡ 
llr,iJq¡ + [nP' +(n-1)qp"-CqqJ~ =0 
e¡ oe¡ 
9 
Solvlng fo, iIij Jik, and iIij ¡la" g;ve" (oqJo,,) = {C"[nP'+(n-J)qP"-C,,J/H} and (oq¡pe,) = [C,.A/HJ, where 
H = (P'-C99) [(n+1)P'+nq P"-Cq9] > O. Thus: (iJq¡/iJe¡) +(n-l)(iJq¡JiJe¡) = l/[(n+ l)P'+niW"-Cqq ] >0, if sufficiency 
holds, and sign{q /é(n) ,n)Jaej} = sign{A}. 
Third, stage 2's necessary condition, given anJ(}q¡ < O, and ili¡ ¡ile; < O, then anJ()e¡ = - (c. + 1) < o. 
dW(n') n(') • (OC l)ilq,/iln ~< n +n iJe+ Oi'¡JiJe 
15 Theposltivity ofCw aside fTom being a concavity requirement needed fro Ihe finn's problem lo be well behaved, can also beinlerpreted as 
decreasing retums lo cosl reducing. 
10 
Applying the implicit function theorem to stage 2's necessary condition gives: 
(del(n)/dn)=~n"ln/nelel' Sufficiency requires that IIy , < O thus: sign(de ¡(n),dn) '" sign{IIe",), where: IIe¡n::= 
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